Understanding What Has Been Happening to the Public‐Sector Pay Premium in Great Britain: A Distributional Approach Based on the Labour Force Survey by Phil, Murphy et al.
 Cronfa -  Swansea University Open Access Repository
   
_____________________________________________________________
   
This is an author produced version of a paper published in:
British Journal of Industrial Relations
                                         
   
Cronfa URL for this paper:
http://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa50294
_____________________________________________________________
 
Paper:
Murphy, P., Blackaby, D., O'Leary, N. & Staneva, A. (2019).  Understanding What Has Been Happening to the Public
Sector Pay Premium in Great Britain: A Distributional Approach Based on the Labour Force Survey. British Journal of
Industrial Relations
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12474
 
 
 
 
 
 
Released under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution License (CC-BY). 
 
_____________________________________________________________
  
This item is brought to you by Swansea University. Any person downloading material is agreeing to abide by the terms
of the repository licence. Copies of full text items may be used or reproduced in any format or medium, without prior
permission for personal research or study, educational or non-commercial purposes only. The copyright for any work
remains with the original author unless otherwise specified. The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium
without the formal permission of the copyright holder.
 
Permission for multiple reproductions should be obtained from the original author.
 
Authors are personally responsible for adhering to copyright and publisher restrictions when uploading content to the
repository.
 
http://www.swansea.ac.uk/library/researchsupport/ris-support/ 
 British Journal of Industrial Relations doi: 10.1111/bjir.12474
0:0 May 2019 0007–1080 pp. 1–28
UnderstandingWhat Has Been
Happening to the Public-Sector Pay
Premium inGreat Britain: A
Distributional Approach Based on the
Labour Force Survey
Philip Murphy , David Blackaby ,
Nigel O’Leary and Anita Staneva
Abstract
This article investigates what has been happening to the public-sector wage
differential in Great Britain over the period 1994–2017. The evidence indicates
that apart from men in the lower part of the pay distribution, the public-sector
pay premium has declined for all public-sector workers. This decline has
coincided with a decline in the overall pay gap, which is associated with changes
in the composition of public- and private-sector workforces. As the relative
pay disadvantage experienced by public-sector workers at the top of the pay
distribution has worsened over time this must raise serious concerns about the
ability of the public sector to recruit and retain the staff it needs to deliver public
services.
1. Introduction
The important part played by public-sector pay in UK Government ﬁnances
has meant that the pay of public-sector workers has attracted increased
interest since the ﬁnancial crisis, particularly as concerns about the size of the
ﬁscal deﬁcit has brought issues around the size of the public-sector pay bill to
the forefront of government policy. As a result, the government has pursued
a policy of wage restraint in the public sector, which has been a consistent
feature of the political landscape in the UK since 2010. In fact, this policy of
restraint is only now just beginning to weaken, as the Government announced
in 2017 that it planned to scrap the 1 per cent public-sector pay cap, and agreed
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a wage increase above the cap to more than 1 million public-sector workers
in the summer of 2018. Nonetheless, the long and sustained period of wage
restraint experienced by public-sector workers in the UK has naturally raised
concerns not only about the effects wage restraint is likely to have on the living
standards of public-sector workers but also on the ability of the public sector
to attract and retain a high-quality workforce.
The use of wage restraint in the public is not a new phenomenon in the
UK, even in recent times. For example, following a period of expansion in
public-sector employment between 1998 and 2005, the then chancellor of the
exchequer Gordon Brown wrote to all Pay Review Bodies in November 2005
urging them to limit recommended wage increases to 2 per cent or less. This
call for restraint was reminiscent of earlier policies pursued in the 1990s and
1980s, where either increases in public-sector pay had to be ﬁnanced from
productivity and efficiency gains or a pay cap was imposed on certain groups
of public-sector workers for a chronological listing of the various policies in
place since 1980, see Pyper et al. (2018).
The pursuit of pay restraint in the public sector in the UK in the 1980s
and 1990s also coincided with labour market reforms that changed the
terms and conditions of employment for many public-sector workers. These
changes sought not only to introduce greater ﬂexibility into public-sector
payment systems but also to increase the exposure of the sector to the forces
of competition by the introduction of contracting out and compulsory
competitive tendering (Bender and Elliott 1999; Elliott and Bender 1997).
However, as the relative pay of many public-sector workers fell, as a result
of both tighter ﬁnancial controls and changes to the terms and conditions
of employment in the public sector, some commentators began to raise
concerns about the ability of the public sector to recruit and retain staff.
Nickell and Quintini (2002), for example, noted that since the mid-1970s
there had been a signiﬁcant decline in the relative pay of most public-sector
employees in the UK, and that this decline coincided with a reduction in
the quality and ability of men entering teaching and general administration
in the early 1990s compared to entrants in the late 1970s. Purely from a
retention and recruitment standpoint, therefore, it is as important today, as it
was then, that pay in the public sector is sufficiently attractive to attract and
retain individuals with the skills and qualiﬁcations needed to deliver public
services. For example, commenting on the potential effects of recent episodes
of wage restraint in the public sector in the UK, Emmerson et al. (2016)
stated: ‘This could result in difficulties for public-sector employers trying to
recruit, retain and motivate high quality workers, and raises the possibility
of (further) industrial relation issues’. Similarly, following a decline in the
relative pay of teachers, the School Teachers Pay Review Body (2016) noted
that ‘recruitment and retention pressures have become more acute, creating a
challenging climate for schools’.
While recruitment and retention issues associated with changes in the
relative pay of public-sector workers are an obvious concern, they are set
against the popular perception that public-sector workers in the UK are well
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paid. This popular view is often encouraged by media coverage that focuses
attention on comparing the average pay of public- and private-sector workers
(i.e. public/private-sector pay gap). However, comparisons made on this basis
typically mask important composition differences between the two sectors,
which can lead to signiﬁcant differences between the average pay of public- and
private-sector workers. The importance of compositional differences between
the workforces of the public and private sector has long been recognized in the
academic literature but their importance has often been ignored in the popular
press.
Bender (1998) and Gregory and Borland (1999) both provide extensive
surveys of the early empirical work devoted to measuring differences in
public/private-sector pay across a wide range of countries. While Lausev
(2014) provides a survey of more recent studies and compares ﬁndings on
public/private pay differences in Eastern European transition economies with
ﬁndings from developed market-based economies. These surveys provide two
useful services. First, they provide a theoretical justiﬁcation of why public-
sector workers’ pay can differ from private-sector workers’ pay. For example,
while pay determination in the private sector is likely to be proﬁt constrained,
pay in the public sector is more likely to be constrained by budgetary
considerations that are determined within a political process. Second, they
provide a summary of the work undertaken on measuring differences in
public- and private-sector pay that account for differences in the composition
of the two sectors. Most of the empirical evidence provided in these surveys
is based on individual micro data, which allow investigators to control for
characteristics that might be expected to affect individual earnings. Findings
on the size of the public-sector pay premium are found to differ across
countries, to vary over time and to depend on both the speciﬁcation of the
earnings equation used and the estimation method employed in the study.
Nonetheless, some stylized facts do emerge for theUK, which are often shared
by other market-based developed economies. For example, in the UK the
public-sector pay premium tends to be higher for women than it is for men,
and varies across the pay distribution: typically being higher at the bottom of
the distribution than at the top, where the male pay premium is often negative.
Despite the importance attached to public-sector pay, evidence on what has
been happening to the public-sector wage premium over time and across the
distribution in the UK is limited. The main aim of this article, therefore, is
to redress this balance by providing evidence on what has been happening
to the public-sector pay premium over the period 1994–2017. The analysis
is based on data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS), and estimates are
provided separately for full-timemale and femaleworkers using a distribution-
based decompositionmethod suggested by Fortin et al. (2010) and Firpo et al.
(2018). The remaining sections of the article are set out as follows. Section 2
provides a summary, with a focus on the UK, of estimates of the public-
sector pay premium; Section 3 outlines the methodology used in the analysis;
Section 4 describes the data; Section 5 presents the results and discussion and
Section 6 offers some conclusions.
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2. UK estimates of the public-sector pay premium
Rees and Shah (1995) used data from theGeneral Household Survey for 1983,
1985 and 1987 and estimated the public-sector pay premium on the basis
of an Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition adjusted for sector
selection (workers choosing to work in either the public or private sector).
The Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition attributes any public/private-sector pay
gap to either differences in the characteristics of workers employed in the two
sectors or differences in the way characteristics are rewarded in the public
and private sectors (the public-sector pay premium). They ﬁnd that while
characteristic differences for men largely explain the public/private pay gap,
for women characteristics in the public sector tend to be rewardedmore highly,
which leads to a positive public-sector pay premium. Bender (2003) used data
from the SCELI Survey for 1986 and found similar ﬁndings for estimates
unadjusted for sector selection.1 However, once sector selection effects were
included the size of the public-sector wage premium increased substantially
for both males and females.
Disney and Gosling (1998) estimated the public-sector wage premium
using a simple intercept shift variable, indicating employment in either the
public or private sector. Using data from the New Earnings Survey over the
period 1979–1994, they ﬁnd that once the occupation of workers is taken into
account the public-sector pay premium fell for both men and women over the
period as a whole, and that the premium had all but disappeared for men by
1994. Similarly, Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007), using data from the British
Household Panel Survey between 1996 and 2003, ﬁnd that while there was
a small public-sector wage differential at speciﬁc points in time, the lifetime
premium was ‘essentially zero for highly employable individuals’.
More recently, while investigating the possibility of regional-based public-
sector pay, Blackaby et al. (2018) estimated the public-sector pay premium
by pooling LFS data for two time periods, 2009Q2–2011Q1 and 2011Q2–
2015Q4. They ﬁnd the pay premium is sensitive to the choice of the
variables used in the earnings equation, and in particular on the inclusion of
establishment size controls. Using the broadest possible speciﬁcation of an
earnings equation, they also ﬁnd that over the two periods the public-sector
pay premium fell for both male and female workers: from −3.9 to −4.1 per
cent for men and from 5.6 to 2.4 per cent for women.
In the UK, and other Western developed economies, a common ﬁnding
from studies that consider how the public-sector pay premium varies across
the pay distribution is that while men in the public sector typically beneﬁt
from a positive pay premium at the lower end of the distribution, at the top
a negative premium is more common. On the other hand, women employed
in the public sector tend do much better than otherwise comparable women
in the private sector at all points in the pay distribution (see Disney and
Gosling (1998) and Blackaby et al. (1999) for the UK; Poterba and Reubon
(1994) and Miller (2009) for the US andMueller (1998) for Canada). Possible
explanations for these ﬁndings include the success of trade unions in the
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public sector in raising the wages of low-paid public-sector workers, political
considerations that seek to limit the pay of more highly paid workers in the
public sector and employers in the public sector pursuing less discriminatory
pay practices. Irrespective of the exact cause, the tendency for employers in the
public sector to pay above the going rate for low- and middle-skilled workers,
and below the going rate for higher skilled groups is not new and was noted
by Fogel and Lewin (1974).
Finally, Disney and Gosling (1998) ﬁnd evidence that suggests the
public–private-sector pay gap in the UK exhibits countercyclical behaviour:
increasing sharply in the two recessions in the early 1980s and late 1980s and
then decreasing as the economy moved towards a cyclical peak in the mid-
1980s and 1990s. Maczulskij (2013) similarly ﬁnds evidence of countercyclical
behaviour in the public-sector pay gap for Finland, suggesting that the greater
sensitivity of private-sector wages to economic conditions may be a common
feature of wage-setting behaviour in the public and private sectors.
3. Methodology
The analysis of pay gaps is often based on a decomposition framework,
which decomposes differences in average pay into a composition and a
pay structure effect. In these studies, the pay structure effect is typically
seen as an estimate of the public-sector pay premium because it shows
how characteristics are rewarded differently in the two sectors, while the
composition effect reﬂects differences in the characteristics of workers in the
two sectors. The decomposition of average wages into these two components is
typically based on anOaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition, which
allows the composition effect to be further broken down into its constituent
parts, showing the inﬂuence of particular characteristics. However, many of
these decompositions were typically based on the sample means of the data,
which is now seen as being too restrictive. As a result, several approaches
have recently been developed that allow pay differences to be analysed at
different points in the pay distribution, and depart from the simple intercept
shift quantile regression method as used by Disney and Gosling (1998), which
assumes characteristics are rewarded equally in the public and private sectors.
An excellent survey of distribution-based approaches to analysing pay
differences is provided by Fortin et al. (2010). For example, DiNardo
et al. (1996) use a non-parametric weighted kernel method to estimate
counterfactual wage densities; while Machado and Mata (MM 2005) use a
semi-parametric method based on conditional quantile estimates to do the
same thing (seeMelly (2005) andLucifora andMeurs (2006) for an application
of theMMmethod to analysing differences in public- and private-sector wages
in Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain). Among the distribution-based
approaches that are available, the use of a regression-based method proposed
by Firpo et al. (2007 and 2018) has recently gained in popularity. Depalo et al.
(2015), for example, use this method to estimate public/private-sector wage
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differences in Euro-area countries. The approach of Firpo et al. can be brieﬂy
summarized as follows.
Let the difference in pay at the τ th percentile (Qτ ) of the pay distributions
of the public and private sectors — Fwg , where g = 1 denotes the public sector
and g = 0 the private sector — be given by:
DQτ = Qτ (Fw1 ) − Qτ (Fw0 ) (1)
The difference in pay between the public and private sectors at the τ th
percentile of the distribution can in turn be decomposed into two separate
parts: (a) a part attributable to differences in the pay structure of the
two sectors and (b) a part attributable to differences in the distribution
of characteristics in the public and private sectors while keeping the pay
structures the same.
In distribution terms, this is equivalent to a standard Oaxaca and Blinder
decomposition.
DQτ =
[
Qτ (Fw1 ) − Qτ
(
Fcw0
)] + [Qτ (Fcw0)− Qτ (Fw0 )] = DSQτ + DXQτ(2)
where Fcw0 is the distribution of pay that would prevail if public-sector workers
were paid according to the pay structure of the private sector. The ﬁrst term
in expression (2), therefore, is the part of the difference in public and private-
sector pay at the τ th percentile attributable to differences in pay structures
between the two sectors (DSQτ the structure effect), while the second term is the
part attributable to differences in the distribution of characteristics between
the two sectors (DXQτ the composition effect). The counterfactual distribution
and the other conditional distributions are found by applying relative weights
to the data as described in Firpo et al. (2007 and 2018).
While the aggregate decomposition given by expression (2) provide
insights into the overall role played by structure and composition effects in
explaining pay differences at different points in the distribution, unlike the
standard Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition it provides no information on the
contribution different characteristics make to the overall composition effect.
However, the method proposed by Firpo et al. (2007 and 2018) provides a
solution to this problem by estimating the relationship between distributional
statistics, based on recentred inﬂuence functions (RIFs), and a set of covariates
using a standard regression model.
Coefficient estimates for the public sector, the private sector and the
counterfactual distribution from the (RIF) regressionmodel at each percentile
(γ̂1,τ , γ̂0,τ and γ̂ cτ ) are then used to deﬁne the aggregate decomposition for the
τ th percentile as:
D̂Qτ =
[
X1γ̂1,τ − Xc0γ̂ cτ
]
+
[
Xc0γ̂
c
τ − X0γ̂0,τ
]
=̂DSQτ +̂DXQτ (3)
where a hat indicates that sample estimates have been substituted for
population parameters, a bar indicates the use of sample means for the
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public (1) and private (0) sectors and Xc0 is the sample mean of the
reweighted characteristics of private-sector workers so that they have the same
characteristics as public-sector workers. In practice, the difference between
components of the decomposition shown in (3) and the equivalent elements
in (2) are only of a second order of importance. Hence, the aggregate structure
and composition effects reported in the analysis below are taken directly from
the estimates given by (3).
Estimates of the pay structure (̂DSQτ ) and composition effects (̂DXQτ ) shown
in (3) can be further broken down into a pure structure effect (̂DS,pQτ ) and a
pure composition effects (DX,pQτ ), along with component that reﬂect either a
speciﬁcation error (̂DX,eQτ ) or a reweighting error (̂DS,eQτ ). In practice, both
the speciﬁcation and reweighting errors should be close to zero, and therefore
act as a test of the model’s performance.
For the structure and composition effects, we have:
̂DSQτ = X1
(
γ̂1,τ − γ̂ cτ
)+ (X1 − Xc0)γ̂ cτ =̂DS,pQτ +̂DS,eQτ (4)
̂DXQτ =
(
Xc0 − X0
)
γ̂0,τ + Xc0(̂γ cτ − γ̂0,τ ) =̂DX,pQτ +̂DX,eQτ (5)
Given the linear nature of expression (5) the contribution of individual
covariates (j = 1, 2, . . . , k) to the pure composition effect can then be shown
to be equal to:
̂DX,pQτ =
k∑
j=1
(
Xc0, j − X0, j
)
γ̂0, j,τ (6)
Of course, a similar breakdown of the pure structure effect is possible, but
as in the standard Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition, where the model includes
categorical variables, estimates of these individual components are sensitive
to the choice of the omitted categories (see Jones 1983). For this reason,
and because the composition effect is not affected by the omitted category
problem, only a detailed breakdown of the composition effect is undertaken.
An important advantage of a linear decomposition, as shown in
expressions (3)–(5), is that it can be used to highlight the part played by
changes in both the structure and composition effects to changes in the overall
pay gap at each percentile of the wage distribution over time. For changes in
the wage gap that occurred between two time periods, therefore, we have:
s
(
D̂Qτ
) = s ([X1γ̂1,τ − Xc0γ̂ cτ
])
+ s
([
Xc0γ̂
c
τ − X0γ̂0,τ
])
= s
(
̂DSQτ
)
+ s
(
̂DXQτ
)
(7)
s
(
̂DSQτ
)
= s
(
X̂1
(
γ̂1,τ − γ̂ cτ
))+ s ((X1 − Xc0
)
γ̂ cτ
)
= s
(
̂DS,pQτ
)
+ s
(
̂DS,eQτ
)
(8)
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s
(
̂DXQτ
)
= s
((
Xc0 − X0
)
γ0,τ
)
+ s
(
Xc0
(
γ̂ c0 − γ̂0,τ
))
= s
(
̂DX,pQτ
)
+ s
(
̂DX,eQτ
)
(9)
where s = xt − xt−s Similarly, the contribution of individual covariates to
the change in the composition effect is:
s
(
̂DX,pQτ
)
=
k∑
j=1
s
((
Xc0, j − X0, j
)
γ̂0, j,τ
)
(10)
4. Data
The data used in the analysis are from the LFS. The LFS is a large-scale
survey conducted by the Office for National Statistics (ONS), which has been
undertaken on a quarterly basis since 1992. The current design of the LFS
provides a sample of approximately 60,000 households in each quarter, and
over the course of the survey respondents are interviewed on ﬁve separate
occasions before being replaced by a new cohort. The rotating sample design
of the LFS means that there is an approximate 80 per cent overlap of
respondents from one-quarter to the next. To ensure individuals are only
sampled once during their participation in the LFS, only those completing
their ﬁfth and ﬁnal interview are included in the analysis. The ﬁfth interview
is also an occasion at which earnings-related questions are asked in the LFS.
Information from quarterly LFS surveys is combined to produce annual
data for the period 1994–2017. The year 1994 was chosen as the starting
point of the analysis because a question on public-sector employment was
not included in the LFS until the third quarter of 1993. Public-sector
employment in the LFS is based on individual self-classiﬁcation. Compared
to employment returns from public-sector organizations reported in Public-
Sector Employment (PSE) statistics, which is the preferred source of the ONS
for estimating the size of the public sector in the UK, the LFS is known
to overestimate the size of the public sector (Millard and Machin 2007). To
examine this issue, Figure A1 in the appendix shows employment in the public
and private sectors using the LFS and PSE. While Figure A1 suggests the
LFS overestimates the size of the public sector, both series seem to track one
another reasonably closely over most of the period analysed. Nonetheless,
in order to consider the effect misclassiﬁcation errors arising from self-
classiﬁcation may have on the results, a sensitivity test was undertaken that
adjusted the LFS deﬁnition of public-sector employment used in the analysis.
Speciﬁcally, following Millard and Machin (2007), individuals employed in
either higher education or as agency workers were classiﬁed as private-
sector employees regardless of how they were self-classiﬁed. Using this
reclassiﬁcation method had the effect of reducing the difference between LFS
and PSE estimates of public-sector employment (see Figure A1).
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Although the LFS is known to have weaknesses, its design and coverage
makes it one of the best sources of data available in the UK to examine
public/private-sector pay differences. In fact, the ONS regularly uses the LFS
to investigate outcomes in the public/private sectors requiring information on
pay and a wide range of worker characteristics. For this reason, and on the
basis of the sensitivity tests reported later, we feel conﬁdent that it is the best
source of data for the analysis undertaken in the article.
The measure of pay used in the analysis is the logarithm of real hourly
earnings, which is found by deﬂating hourly earnings by the retail price
index at constant 1990 prices. It is possible that the hourly earnings measure
reported in the LFS may include an element of performance-related pay,
for which no additional information is provided. As such payments are
more likely to affect the pay of private-sector workers their inﬂuence might
normally be expected to reduce the size of public/private-sector pay gap,
particularly at the top of the pay distribution where performance pay can
have a more signiﬁcant impact on earnings. Of course, the size of any effect
that performance-related pay has on the public/private-sector pay gap is likely
to depend on underlying economic conditions, particularly as such payments
tend to increase in an economic upturn and fall in a downturn. Interestingly,
in a related study Bryson et al. (2017) ﬁnd that the unexplained gap in the use
of performance pay in the private and public sectors is signiﬁcantly reduced
when controlling for occupational status and other worker characteristics.
This suggests that including occupations and other worker characteristics in
the analysis might act as a useful control for unobserved performance pay
effects.
While estimates of public/private-sector pay premiums reported in the
literature often differ according to the speciﬁcation of the earnings equation
used, the econometric method employed and the country of study, there
is nevertheless a broad consensus about the type of variables that should
be included in the analysis. For example, most earnings equation estimates
include demographic, human capital and workplace characteristics that
have been shown to affect earnings. Consequently, in this analysis the
construction of the counterfactual pay distributions and the RIF regressions
used in the detailed decompositions included the following variables: age and
age squared, age left full-time education, highest educational qualiﬁcation,
marital status, job tenure, occupation, region of work, establishment size and
white ethnicity.2 A deﬁnition for each of these variables is given in Table A1
in the appendix.
Both highest educational qualiﬁcation and age left full-time education are
included in the analysis to capture the inﬂuence schooling and certiﬁcation
effects can have on pay. Similarly age and age-squared are intended to
capture the nonlinear nature of the age-earnings relationship suggested by
a human capital model. Job tenure serves a similar role and can reﬂect
both the acquisition of ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills and/or the presence of an internal
labour market in the workplace, which is designed to promote co-operation
and knowledge transfers between experienced and inexperienced workers
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(Doeringer and Piore 1971; Topel 1991). Region of work, on the other hand, is
included in the analysis to capture region-speciﬁc effects, which includes local
labour market conditions that can affect pay.
While the decision to include most of the variables used in public/private-
sector earnings equations is largely uncontested, others have attracted more
critical attention. For example, Belman and Heywood (1989, 1990) have
argued that establishment size should be included because public-sector
establishments tend to be larger, and because pay and establishment size
are positively related (Brown and Medoff 1989). Similarly, Moulton (1990)
has argued that detailed occupation controls should be included to reﬂect
the different distributions of occupation in the two sectors. However, others
have argued that both establishment size and occupation should be excluded.
Establishment size because it can represent the inﬂuence of monopsony
power, and occupation because some occupations tend to be found almost
exclusively in the public sector. Notwithstanding the rationale provided by
Bryson et al. (2017) for using occupation as a control for the potential
inﬂuence of unobserved performance-related pay effects, it seems likely that
the broad deﬁnition of occupation used in the current analysis makes any
problems relating to the speciﬁcity of public-sector occupations much less
important. However, in order to investigate the sensitivity of the results
to arguments relating to the use of establishment size and occupation two
additional sensitivity tests were undertaken. First, establishment size and
occupation were both excluded from the analysis; and second, public- and
private-sector samples were matched on the basis of 3/4 digit occupation
codes occurring in both sectors.3 The results of these sensitivity tests are again
reported later.
Of course, it is virtually impossible to control for every characteristic
that might inﬂuence earnings. For example, it was not possible to include
other job-related characteristics whose incidence and inﬂuence might vary
by sector. This included job security, the risk of personal injury and fringe
beneﬁts, which includes pension entitlement. Elsewhere Disney et al. (2009)
and Danzer and Dolton (2012) have used the concept of ‘total reward’ to
calculate the present value of the remuneration package for different types of
employees. For example, Danzer and Dolton (2012) compared total rewards
for highly educated public- and private-sector workers and concluded that
while rewards were broadly equalized for men, women had a clear advantage
in the public sector. Elsewhere, Cribb and Emmerson (2014) have shown that
when pensions and other beneﬁts are taken into account the public/private-
sector pay premium depends not only on what group of workers are being
compared but also on what beneﬁts are included. Given advocates of total
reward analysis recognize the high demands of data needed to implement their
approach, in line with much of the existing research on public/private-sector
pay differences pension entitlement is not explicitly considered in the analysis.
As a result, estimates of the public-sector pay premium reported below
might underestimate the differential where public-sector pension provision is
typically better than private-sector pension provision.
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As pay structures are unlikely to be the same for full-time and part-time
workers and are also known to differ for male and female workers, we restrict
the analysis to full-time employees and present separate estimates for males
and females. The means of the variables for 1994 and 2017 are available as
an online appendix (Table OA). They show a fairly typical pattern for this
kind of data: namely, that compared to private-sector workers, workers in the
public sector tend to be older, better qualiﬁed, more likely to be in higher level
occupations than in semi-routine or routine occupations, less likely to work in
small establishments and have longer job tenure.
In addition to these workforce differences, Table OA also indicates that a
number of demographic shifts have taken place in the data over time, which
have affected the public and private sectors in similar ways. For example,
the proportion of degree-holders (or more accurately degree and degree
equivalent qualiﬁcations) and ethnic minorities has increased over time, while
the proportion of full-time employees who are married (or living as married)
has fallen for both males and females. Both features of full-time employment
are consistent with changes that have occurred in the characteristics of the
overall LFS sample between 1994 and 2017.
5. Results and discussion
All results reported in this section are based on an analysis of annual LFS data
between 1994 and 2017. In each case, the analysis is undertaken separately
for each year and separate estimates are also provided for male and female
(full-time) employees. Results are reported at different points of the pay
distribution, speciﬁcally at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles. All
estimates are based on data using earnings weights provided in the LFS.
Aggregate Decomposition
Estimates of the aggregate decomposition given by (3) are shown in Figure 1
for males and females separately. At each percentile level, the graphs show
the pay gap (D̂Qτ ), the part of the pay gap attributable to differences in pay
structures between the public and private sectors (̂DSQτ the structure effect or
public/private-sector pay premium) and the part of the pay gap attributable
to differences in the distribution of characteristics of employees in the public
and private sectors (̂DXQτ the composition effect). The graphs shown in
Figure 1 report point estimates of the aggregate decomposition: additional
information on the statistical signiﬁcance of the individual components of the
decomposition reported in Figure 1 is available from the authors upon request.
Some important features of the results reported in Figure 1 can be
summarized as follows. First, for the period as a whole, the pay gap between
public and private-sector workers has fallen across the pay distribution for
both male and female workers. However, the fall has been higher at the top
of the distribution than at the bottom, and also tends to be higher for female
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FIGURE 1
Aggregate Decomposition Results by Gender and Percentile.
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workers than for male workers. Hence, for female (male) workers the overall
pay gap fell by 31 (22) per cent at the 90th percentile between 1994 and
2017, compared to a 20 (5) per cent reduction at the 10th percentile over the
same period.4 The composition effect also falls for men and women over the
period 1997–2017. However, while the decline in the composition effect tends
to be larger at the top of the distribution than at the bottom for women, for
men the decline follows a less distinctive pattern across the distribution, even
though the largest falls are at the 10th and 90th percentiles. Differences in the
experience of men and women are perhaps more interesting in terms of what
has been happening to the structure effect (public-sector pay premium) over
time. For example, while the public-sector pay premium increased between
1994 and 2017 for men at the 10th (a 6 percentage point increase from 1
to 7 per cent) and 25th (a 4 percentage point increase from −4 to −0 per
cent) percentiles, it fell at every other reported percentile for both men and
women. The largest reductions in the public-sector pay premium tended to
occur at the top of the pay distribution, even though the reductions were
almost as high at the bottom of the distribution than they were at the top
for women. However, while positive public-sector pay premia are a common
feature of the data at the bottom of pay distribution, at the top the premium
is almost invariably negative for both male and female workers. Hence, at the
top of the distribution not only do public-sector workers face a relative pay
disadvantage compared to otherwise comparable private-sector workers but
their position has also worsened over time. For example, at the 90th percentile,
the public-sector pay premium for men fell from−11 to−25 per cent between
1994 and 2017, while for women it fell from 2 to −10 per cent over the
same period.5
Second, when the pay of public-sector workers is compared to private-
sectorworkers, female public-sectorworkers tend to fare better than theirmale
counterparts. The relative advantage enjoyed by female public-sector workers
is typically evident in both measures of the overall pay gap and the public-
sector pay premium. However, as Figure 1 shows in the bottom half of the
pay distribution — where a positive public-sector pay premium is more likely
— the relative advantage enjoyed by female public-sector workers has fallen
over the period as a whole: reﬂecting the markedly different changes in the pay
premium enjoyed by men and women in the bottom half of the distribution,
as noted in the previous paragraph.
Third, where there is a positive pay gap but a negative pay premium,
the composition effect must by deﬁnition be larger than the observed pay
gap. However, the change in the relative importance of composition and
structure effects in explaining the overall public-sector pay gap over the
period is perhaps more interesting. Thus, while the (absolute) magnitude of
composition effects tend to be larger than structure effects at the bottom of the
pay distribution, at the top of the distribution structure effects have become
much more important over time. This is most evidently the case for men at
the 90th percentile, where the (absolute) magnitude of the structure effect by
the end of the period was signiﬁcantly larger than the composition effect. An
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increase in the relative importance given to structure effects is also evident
at other points of the pay distribution. For example, the (absolute) size of
structure and composition effects was almost equally important for women
at the 90th percentile, and for men at the 75th percentile, by 2017. At the top
of the distribution, therefore, differences in pay structures between the public
and private sectors have widened despite government policies that have sought
to make public-sector pay structures more like the private sector.
Fourth, and ﬁnally, while there have been reductions in both the public-
sector pay gap and the public-sector pay premium over the period as a
whole, these declines are neither constant from year-to-year nor do the
changes observed always occur at the same time. However, some similarities
in the proﬁles shown in Figure 1 are evident. For example, with the possible
exception of men at the 10th and 25th percentiles, changes in the public-
sector pay gap and in public-sector premium can be broadly characterized
as follows: a period of decline between 1994 and the early 2000s; followed by
episodes of improvement and decline between the early 2000s and the period
immediately following the 2008/2009 recession; and then a further period of
decline towards the end of the data period.6
These changes in the public-sector pay premium are most likely the
result of a number of different inﬂuences, which can potentially pull in
different directions at different times. However, the main contributors are
likely to include (a) differences in workforce composition; and (b) differences
in public/private-sector pay structures and how they respond to market
conditions and government policy.
For example, it has been argued that the countercyclical behaviour often
observed in public/private-sector pay is the result of private-sector pay being
more responsive to market conditions than public-sector pay (Disney and
Gosling 1998;Maczulskij 2013). However, the nature of this effect will depend
on a number of other factors, which include the extent to which public-
sector spending decisions directly inﬂuence the size of pay settlements in
the public sector, the extent to which some groups in the public sector are
favoured relative to others and the extent to which pay reform in the public
sector has resulted in more ﬂexible pay structures. The resulting situation
is necessarily complex but it is nevertheless consistent with some of the
changes observed in Figure 1. For example, the decline in the public-sector
pay gap, and public-sector pay premia, which occurred between 1994 and
the early 2000s, coincided with a period of economic recovery and a period
of strict ﬁscal control. Fiscal conditions were tightened in the UK by the
Conservative government in the early 1990s and continued until the end of the
1990s, following the decision made by the newly elected Labour government
in 1997 to continue with the tight spending plans set out by the previous
administration until 1999. Fiscal austerity, together with a curb on public-
sector pay, either in the form of a public-sector pay freeze (2011–2013) or a 1
per cent public-sector pay cap (2013–2017), was also a distinctive feature of
the period of decline witnessed in both the public-sector pay gap and public-
sector pay premium towards the end of the period: when the economy was
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slowly recovering from the effects of the 2008/2009 recession. Interestingly,
in the much of the intervening period between these two episodes of decline
in the public-sector pay gap and pay premium, the economy enjoyed a
period of sustained economic growth and a commitment on the part of the
government to invest in public services and the public sector. Hence, public-
sector employment grew from the late 1990s until the mid-2000s, and even
though Pay Review Bodies were urged by Gordon Brown in 2005 to keep
pay settlements to less than 2 per cent, a formal policy of public-sector pay
restraint and ﬁscal austerity was only introduced in the UK following the
election of the coalition government in 2010.
The relative experience of public-sector workers shown in Figure 1,
particularly in terms of seeing a positive pay premium at the bottom of the
distribution and a negative pay premium at the top, is consistent with an
argument that suggests pay setting arrangements in the public sector favour
low-skilled workers over high-skilled workers (Fogel and Lewin 1974; Gregory
1990). In fact, extracts from official government policy announcements made
in the UK during this period provide evidence to support the existence of such
arrangements. For example, in 2009 the Labour government announced that
it believed ‘senior staff should show leadership in pay restraint’ (Pyper et al.
2018). Similarly, when announcing the two-year public-sector pay freeze in
2010, the coalition government deliberately excluded public-sector workers
earning £21,000 or less from the policy: instead these workers were to receive
a pay increase of at least £250. Of course, it would be tempting to attribute
the improvement in both the public-sector pay gap and pay premium at the
bottom of the distribution to this policy. However, given that the improvement
was seen only for men, and started prior to the introduction of the pay freeze,
there is little to support this claim. Instead longer-term policy considerations,
which have sought to favour lower-skilled public-sector workers, are more
likely to have resulted in some public-sector workers having enjoyed a greater
relative pay advantage than others.
Perhaps the strongest signal provided by the UK government that it
wished to address inequalities in the pay distribution was the introduction
of the National Minimum Wage (NMW) in April 1999. However, while
improvements in the public-sector pay premium at the bottom end of the
distribution occurred at around the same time as the introduction of the
NMW, it seems unlikely that this could have been the cause of the changes
reported in Figure 1. For example, the general consensus is that only about
4 per cent of workers are paid the NMW (Low Pay Commission 2012), and
spillover effects have been found to be relatively small (Stewart 2012).7 As a
result, it seems unlikely that the NMW could have affected the percentiles of
the pay distribution considered here; particularly as the analysis is based on
full-time workers and the groups affected most by the NMW tended to be
employed in the private sector, tended to be female and tended to be employed
on a part-time basis (Bryson and Lucchino 2014).
The ﬁnding that women tend to do better than men, and that the public-
sector premium is higher at the bottom of the pay distribution than at the top,
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is consistent with much of the international evidence on public-sector pay in
both the UK and in other developed economies. For example, differences in
the estimated pay premium at different points of the pay distribution provide
support for the argument that egalitarian and antidiscriminatory pay setting
policies pursed in the public sector have resulted in the public sector having a
more compressed wage distribution than the private sector (see Poterba and
Rueben (1994) for the USA; Mueller (1998) for Canada; Disney and Gosling
(1998) and Blackaby et al. (1999) for the UK and Lucifora and Meurs (2006)
for an international comparison). In fact, some commentators have cited the
push for greater equality in the public sector as the main reason why ‘low
wages’ tend to be higher in the public sector and ‘high wages’ tend to be higher
in the private sector (Yu et al. 2005). However, the ﬁnding that the relative
advantage enjoyed by women in the public sector has fallen over time when
compared to men, particularly at the bottom of the distribution, suggests a
more complex process is at work. In particular, it seems that changes in pay
structures at the bottom of the pay distribution have worked to improve the
relative advantage of men in the public sector.
On the other hand, changes in the size of the negative public-sector pay
premium at the top end of the pay distribution suggests that over the period
as a whole differences in pay structures between the public and private sectors
have resulted in an increase in the disadvantage faced by bothmale and female
public-sector workers when they are compared toworkers in the private sector.
In fact, the decline in the public-sector pay premium seen at the top of the pay
distribution represents a continuation of a much longer period decline in the
UK: as identiﬁed by Disney and Gosling (1998) for the period 1979–1994 and
by Yu et al. (2005) for the period 1994–2001.
Finally, it is worth noting that the movements in pay reported in Figure 1
are based on an analysis of the whole of the public sector, which is then
compared to the whole of the private sector. However, as Dolton et al.
(2015) point out public-sector employees are not a homogenous group, which
is further complicated by the fact that their pay is determined by either
the recommendations of Pay Review Bodies or by collective bargaining
arrangements. Using a difference-in-difference approach Dolton et al. (2015)
ﬁnd evidence of year-to-year stability in the relative earnings of workers
covered by different Pay Review Bodies over the period 1994–2007. While
differences in the econometric approaches adopted make it difficult to directly
compare the Dolton et al. (2015) estimates with our own, the ﬁnding that
Pay Review Bodies have been unable in the short run to exert an independent
inﬂuence on pay implies that the inclusion of appropriate occupation controls
should allow different groups of workers in the public sector to be combined
without any serious loss of generality.
Decomposition Based on RIF Estimates
Since RIF-based estimates of the reweighting error are typically small and
statistically insigniﬁcant, estimates of the pure structure effect closely follow
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the aggregate structure effect reported in Figure 1. As a result, estimates of the
pure structure effect and reweighting error are not reproduced here. Instead,
Figure 2 shows estimates of the composition effect as given by equation (5):
the pure composition effect (̂DX,pQτ ) and the speciﬁcation error (̂DX,eQτ ).
8
Figure 2 indicates that while the pure composition effect tends to
underestimate (overestimate) the composition effect at the bottom (top) of the
distribution, both effects follow similar paths over the period as a whole, with
the closeness of the two components being better at the top of the distribution
than at the bottom. In fact, the relationship between the composition and
pure composition effects are sufficiently similar to suggest that a detailed
breakdown of the pure composition effect has value in identifying the factors
that have contributed to changes in the composition effect over time.9
For the detailed decomposition of the pure composition effect (equation
(6)), the variables included in the model are conveniently aggregated into
eight separate groups: namely, age, education, job tenure, marital status,
occupation, region of work, establishment size and white ethnicity. With two
exceptions, the contributions made by these groups to the pure composition
effect differ not only across the pay distribution but also over time. The two
exceptions worth noting are: ﬁrst, at the top of the distribution education
consistently makes the single largest contribution to the pure composition
effect over time; and second, occupation makes a signiﬁcant contribution to
the pure composition effect at a number of percentile levels over time. Because
the time proﬁles of the other variables are more closely grouped over time,
there is little to be gained in reporting year-by-year estimates of the detailed
decomposition.10 However, components of the detailed decomposition have
more value in explaining changes that have occurred over time and it is to
these changes that we now turn.
The falls in the public-sector pay gap that have occurred across the
pay distribution between 1994 and 2017 is mirrored by falls in both the
composition and pure composition effects (Figures 1 and 2). In order to
examine these changes in more detail, Table 1 provides information on the
changes that have occurred in the components of the pure composition effect
between 1994 and 2017. For the sake of completeness, Table 1 also shows the
changes that have occurred in the aggregate components of the decomposition
between the same dates. The results shown for the aggregate decomposition
are based on equation (7), and the result for the detailed decomposition of the
pure composition effect on equation (10) using the eight groups of variables
deﬁned earlier. Table 1 is split into parts (a) and (b): part (a) shows the changes
that have occurred in both the aggregate decomposition and the detailed
components of the pure composition effect for males, while part (b) does the
same for females.
With the exception of females at the 50th percentile, where the change in the
pure composition effect does not reach a conventional level of signiﬁcance,
Table 1 indicates that all other composition-based changes — composition
and pure composition effects— are signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level or better.
Table 1 also highlights the components that have consistently contributed to
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FIGURE 2
Breakdown of Composition Effect by Gender and Percentile.
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TABLE 1
Changes in the Aggregate and Detailed Decompositions by Percentile and Gender: 1994–2017
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Part (a) Male
 Overall −0.0498*** −0.0277 −0.0782*** −0.1928*** −0.2232***
 Structure 0.0564** 0.0345 −0.0434 −0.1169*** −0.1383***
 Composition −0.1062*** −0.0622*** −0.0347* −0.0759*** −0.0849**
 Pure Comp −0.1065*** −0.0850*** −0.0424*** −0.0441** −0.1135***
Age −0.0257*** −0.0095** −0.0037 −0.0080* −0.0122**
Education −0.0029 −0.0079 −0.0034 −0.0248*** −0.0731***
Job tenure −0.0284*** −0.0190*** −0.0121** −0.0122* −0.0217***
Marital status −0.0104*** −0.0071*** −0.0004 0.0059** 0.0056*
Region of work −0.0020 −0.0088*** −0.0214*** −0.0343*** −0.0319***
Occupation −0.0185*** −0.0200*** −0.0032 0.0092 0.0080
Establishment size −0.0198*** −0.0132*** 0.0015 0.0195*** 0.0105
White 0.0012 0.0005 0.0004 0.0006 0.0012
Part (b) Female
 Overall −0.1971*** −0.1585*** −0.1285*** −0.2212*** −0.3089***
 Structure −0.1077*** −0.0781*** −0.0508* −0.0894*** −0.1225**
 Composition −0.0893*** −0.0804*** −0.0777*** −0.1319*** −0.1864**
 Pure Comp −0.0778*** −0.0452*** −0.0106 −0.1759*** −0.2388***
Age −0.0051 0.0001 0.0116 −0.0070 −0.0154*
Education −0.0177 −0.0286*** −0.0437*** −0.1451*** −0.1996***
Job tenure −0.0105 −0.0147** −0.0021 −0.0044 0.0040*
Marital status −0.0086 −0.0060 −0.0049 0.0036 0.0092
Region of work −0.0021 −0.0030 −0.0173*** −0.0203*** −0.0177***
Occupation −0.0231** 0.0112 0.0375*** −0.0276** −0.0295**
Establishment size −0.0110 −0.0046 0.0081 0.0222*** 0.0075
White 0.0003 0.0004 0.0001 0.0027** 0.0026**
Note: Age (includes age and age-squared), education (includes age left school and highest
educational qualiﬁcation), tenure (includes work tenure variables), marital status (includes
marital status variables), occupation (includes NS-SEC occupation codes), region (includes
standard regions of work), establishment size (includes establishment size variables) and white. *,
** and *** denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
a signiﬁcant reduction in the pure composition effect. For example, in the
bottom half of the pay distribution for men these were age, job tenure, marital
status, occupation and establishment size. The equivalent components in the
top half of the distribution were education, job tenure and region of work.
For women on the other hand, few components were found to be consistently
signiﬁcant in the bottom half of the pay distribution, although occupation
was signiﬁcant at the 10th percentile and education and job tenure at the 25th
percentile. By contrast, at the top of the female pay distribution, education,
region of work and occupation all contributed signiﬁcantly to a reduction in
the pure composition effect over the period 1994–2017.
Table 1 indicates that changes in the education component were the largest
single cause of the reduction in the pure composition effect for men and
women at the top of the distribution over the period. For men, it accounted
for 64 per cent of the change, and for women it was even higher at 84 per cent.
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Together with the decline seen in the public-sector pay premium at the top of
the distribution, these ﬁndings naturally reinforce concerns about the public
sector’s ability to attract and retain the high-quality staff it needs to deliver
public services. In fact as Blackaby et al. (2015) have recently highlighted, the
problems faced by the public sector in recruitment and retention are likely
to have been exacerbated by changes in a number of ‘non-pecuniary’ aspects
of public-sector jobs, which have reduced their attractiveness compared to
the private sector. Changes in the relative attractiveness of public-sector jobs
are serious and likely to have important implications for service delivery. For
example, Propper and VanReenen (2010) ﬁnd that poor hospital performance
in high earning areas in the UK was related to issues concerning the ability to
recruit, retain and motivate NHS staff.
Sensitivity Analysis
To consider the sensitivity of the ﬁndings to changes inmodel speciﬁcation and
to misclassiﬁcation errors arising from the self-reported measure of public-
sector attachment used in the LFS, a number of sensitivity tests are reported
in Table 2. The tests for the aggregate decomposition are based on three
speciﬁcations: speciﬁcation 1 represents the baseline model, as reported in
Figure 1, and is included for comparison purposes; speciﬁcation 2 follows
Millward and Machin (2007) and reclassiﬁes agency and higher education
employees as working in the private sector; speciﬁcation 3 bases the analysis
on a matched sample of 3/4-digit occupations in the public and private sectors
and speciﬁcation 4 excludes both occupation and establishment size variables
from the model. Two points from the results shown in Table 2 are worth
highlighting. First, using the Millward and Machin (2005) reclassiﬁcation
method results in a reduction in both the overall pay gap and composition
effect over time. Moreover, while some differences in the structure effect for
speciﬁcation 2 also arise (for example, men at the top of the distribution do
slightly better and women slightly worse compared to speciﬁcation 1), more
generally changes in the components of the aggregate decomposition for this
speciﬁcation remain qualitatively similar to those reported for speciﬁcation
1.11 Second, excluding occupation and establishment size variables from
the model has the effect of reducing the size of the composition effect
and increasing the size of the pay premium in the bottom half of the pay
distribution. The effects produced in the top half of the distribution are by
comparison smaller and less signiﬁcant. RIF estimates of the pure structure
and composition effects for speciﬁcations 1 and 4 follow a similar pattern
and indicate that while differences in these effects for the two models are
statistically signiﬁcant in the bottom half of the pay distribution, in the
top half of the distribution they are not. Interestingly, RIF-based estimates
for individual years between 1994 and 2017 also indicate that differences in
speciﬁcation and reweighting errors for the two models are not statistically
signiﬁcant in an overwhelming majority of cases.12 Given there is little
evidence to support the choice of speciﬁcation 4 over speciﬁcation 1 on the
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basis of model performance, and given all the remaining sensitivity tests
reported in Table 2 produce qualitatively similar results, our preference is
for a model that includes the widest possible range of variables known to
affect earnings: namely, speciﬁcation 1. More generally, all the sensitivity tests
reported in Table 2 provide strong support for the argument that the direction
of change identiﬁed by the analysis is correct and not merely an artefact of
misclassiﬁcation errors or model speciﬁcation.
6. Conclusion
This article has examined what has been happening to the pay of public-
sector workers over the period 1994–2017. The analysis conﬁrms that over
the period, with the exception of men at the lower quartile and below, there
has been a decline in the public-sector pay premium, which represents the
continuation of an earlier trend that has seen the relative position of public-
sector workers fall over time. Moreover, the position of public-sector workers
is undoubtedly worse at the top end of the pay distribution where a negative
public-sector pay premium is not only more commonly found but the pay
disadvantage faced by public-sector workers has also grown over time.
While the public-sector pay premium has secularly fallen over time at most
points in the pay distribution, there are still year-to-year variations in the
premium. However, many of these changes seem to be broadly consistent
with either changing economic and ﬁscal conditions or a policy pursued
by wage setters in the public sector to favour low-skilled over more highly
skilled workers. Thus, the relative pay of public-sector workers tends to move
countercyclically, and low-paid public workers tend to do better than high-
paid public-sector workers when compared to similar workers in the private
sector.
Differences in the composition of the public sector and private sectors
have made a signiﬁcant contribution to the overall public-sector pay gap over
time. For example, education and occupation are two of the most important
compositional differences accounting for differences in pay between the two
sectors: education at the top of the pay distribution and occupation across the
distribution. However, other differences such as age, job tenure, establishment
size and region have also made signiﬁcant contributions at different points in
the pay distribution, although their effect not only tends to be smaller but also
their importance can vary over time.
Looking across the period as a whole, there has been a signiﬁcant reduction
in the effect that compositional differences have had on the relative pay of
public- and private-sector workers. For men, a range of characteristics was
identiﬁed, although the importance of particular characteristics depended on
which part of the distribution was being considered. The picture for women,
on the other hand, was less clear-cut, at least in terms of the statistical
signiﬁcance of different characteristics being able to explain how reductions
in the pure composition effect affected the relative pay of public and private
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sectors over the period as a whole. What does not seem to be in doubt,
however, is that changes in the educational endowments of the public and
private sectors was an important driver of changes in the relative pay of male
and female public-sector workers at the top of the pay distribution. Of course,
such changes might be expected over a period of almost 25 years, but they also
coincided with a substantial decline in the public-sector pay premium, which
signiﬁcantly increased the pay disadvantage faced by public-sector workers at
the top of the pay distribution. This raises serious concerns about the ability of
the public sector to retain and recruit the high-quality staff it needs to deliver
public services. The government must recognize, therefore, that if it wants to
provide high-quality and sustainable public services it needs to adopt a public-
sector pay policy that does not focus solely on the short-term goal of reducing
pressure on the public ﬁnances. As noted by Runge et al. (2017), this should
reduce the need for ad hoc responses to recruitment and retention difficulties
caused by local and national labour shortages, and allow the public sector to
develop a more coherent and strategic response to workforce issues.
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Notes
1. The SCELI Survey was based on a sample of six local labour markets that were
chosen to provide contrasting patterns of employment in Great Britain.
2. In addition, the number of dependent children and interactions between age and
age left school were included in the probitmodel for sector choice (public vs private
sector employment) used to generate the counterfactual pay distributions. The
decision to include the number of dependent children in the sector attachment
equation reﬂects the common perception that public sector jobs offer more
family-friendly working arrangements, which are more attractive to workers with
children. Similarly, experimentation with various interactions effects in the sector
attachment equation suggested that interactions between age and age left school
produced the best results in terms of the size and signiﬁcance of the reweighting
errors in the RIF decomposition.
3. Matching was performed using 339 unique three-digit occupations from the
SOC90 codes (1994–2000), the 353 four-digit occupations from the SOC2000
codes (2001–2010) and the 369 four-digit occupations from the SOC2010 codes
(2011–2017).
4. These differences are presented in percentage terms, although technically they are
log point differences.
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5. Signiﬁcance tests for these changes are reported in Table 1.
6. The UK recession officially lasted from 2008Q2 to 2009Q2, although
unemployment did not peak until 2011Q3 and there were also episodes of
negative growth in gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010, 2011 and 2012. In fact,
GDP in the UK did not return to its 2008 level until 2014Q3, suggesting that the
effects of the recession have been long lasting.
7. Although Bryson and Lucchino (2014) found that mangers in 30 per cent of
establishments in the 2011 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey mentioned the
NMW as having inﬂuenced pay settlements of the largest occupational group.
8. The RIF estimates on which these decompositions are based are available from
the authors on request. However, it is worth noting that the estimates share some
common features with a standard regression analysis of earnings. Thus, RIF-
based estimates tend to increase with age (but at a decreasing rate), educational
attainment, occupational status, job tenure and establishment size.
9. The nature of the relationship between the composition and pure composition
effects is of interest because the size and signiﬁcance of the speciﬁcation error
provides less strong support for the linearity assumption made in the RIF-based
decomposition.
10. These estimates are available from the authors upon request.
11. On the recommendation of a referee, we also considered removing Higher
Education and not-for-proﬁt employees from the analysis. The general pattern
of results was the same as speciﬁcation 2, although the magnitude of the pure
composition effect did increase at the 90th percentile for both males and females
in the early part of the period. By contrast, differences in the pure structure effect
(relative to speciﬁcation 2) were invariably statistically insigniﬁcant.
12. Estimates of these differences and estimated standard errors are available from the
authors upon request.
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Appendix
FIGURE A1
Public-Sector Employment, 1994–1997: LFS and PSE.
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TABLE A1
Variable Deﬁnitions
Deﬁnition
Real hourly pay The natural logarithm of gross hourly earnings deﬁned in January 1990
prices.
Age Age of the respondent in year, entered in linear and quadratic form.
Years of Schooling The number of years spent in full-time education.
Qualiﬁcations A series of dummy variables denoting the highest equivalent
educational qualiﬁcation of the respondent: 1 — degree; 2 —
A-Level; 3 — O-Level/GCSE; 4 — other; 5 — none (E).
Job tenure A series of dummy variables denoting the tenure with current employer
of the respondent: 1 —  1 year; 2 — 1–2 years; 3 — 2–5 years; 3 —
5–10 years; 4 — 10–20 years; 5 — 20+ years.
Marital status A series of dummy variables denoting the marital status of the
respondent: 1 — married; 2 — single (E); 3 — widowed, divorced or
separated.
Region of work A series of dummy variables denoting the government office region of
work of the respondent: 1 — Northern (E); 2 — Yorkshire &
Humberside; 3 — East Midlands; 4 — East Anglia; 5 — London; 6
— South East; 7 — South West; 8 —West Midlands; 9 — North
West; 10 —Wales; 11 — Scotland.
White A dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the respondent is of a
white ethnic background, and 0 otherwise.
Occupation A series of dummy variables denoting the occupation of the
respondent: 1 — higher managerial and professional; 2 — lower
managerial and professional; 3 — intermediate occupations; 4 —
lower supervisory and technical (E); 5 — semi-routine occupations;
6 — routine occupations.
Establishment size A series of dummy variables denoting the establishment size where the
respondent works: 1 — 1–10 employees; 2 — 11–20 employees; 3 —
21–24 employees; 4 — 25–49 employees (E); 5 — 50 or more
employees.
Number of children The number of dependent children in the respondent’s household.
Note: (E) denotes an excluded dummy variable category.
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